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Banks are very important financial intermediaries since they help bridge the gap 
between the collection and the use of resources. Limited resources can be made 
available to investors through this banking channel. Reliability is the key factor in 
this relationship; the bank is not supposed to be a risky institution for its depositors. 
If depositors lose their confidence in the banking system, this will damage all 
economic activities as the link between the real and the financial sectors of the 
economy is interrupted, since bank crises are contagious. For this reason, some 
countries have put security measures into place to help reduce this systemic risk 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000). The most common security 
measures are minimum limit for capital adequacy ratio, the ceiling for interest rates, 
and the restrictions for the ownership of a bank. However, international experiences  
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show that most of these precautions do not prevent some banks from going out of 
business.  
Consequently, another instrument called deposit insurance has been developed as 
a precautionary measure to protect depositors against bank runs. This instrument 
has one explicit and two implicit targets. The explicit target is to protect depositors. 
The implicit targets are to reduce the unpleasant macroeconomic consequences of 
bank failures and to prevent contagious effects of panics during crises in the 
financial sector. 
Deposit insurance has different regulations across countries, ranging from full to 
partial coverage, from explicit to implicit appliance, from being compulsory to non 
compulsory. Deposit insurance may also differ in terms of premium 
implementation.  
It has been argued that extending deposit insurance coverage to 100 % of bank 
deposits would enhance the stability of the banking system. For example, 
Humphrey (1976, p.97) claimed that “By reducing the likelihood that a ‘problem’ 
bank will be pushed into a serious liquidity squeeze through a run by large 
depositors who withdraw funds or CD holders who fail to roll-over their 
certificates, 100 % deposit insurance would decrease the probability that 
manageable problems will suddenly become unmanageable and lead to bank failure 
or insolvency. Informed market regulation, to the extent it exists, will depend solely 
on the participants in the equity and federal funds markets”.  
On the other hand, some economists such as Garcia (1994), Thakor and 
Greenbaum (1995), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996), and Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Detragiache (1998) argue that the most evident danger of full coverage application 
is the moral hazard problem that makes depositors less careful initially in the 
selection of their bank and, later discourages them from moving their funds to safer 
banks. Garcia points out that “The bank owners and managers of the insured bank, 
knowing that runs are unlikely, may take on additional risk in their asset portfolios, 
reduce the amount of capital and liquid reserves they hold to enable them to 
weather shocks”(Garcia 1994, p.6). 
In Turkey, the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) was founded in 1985 as 
an independent legal entity although it is managed by the Central Bank of Turkey. 
According to Bank Acts of 1985, saving deposits will be insured by the SDIF. Since 
the membership of the SDIF is mandatory for all banks, they all have to pay a  
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premium into the fund. Coverage limits and premium criteria have changed several 
times in line with changes in the economic and financial environment. 
In 1994, the Turkish economy experienced a serious currency crisis, causing the 
biggest output loss in the history of the Turkish Republic, severely deteriorated 
financial statements and three more bank runs. In May 5 1994, immediately after 
the financial crisis, the Council of Ministers issued a decree ordering massive 
changes in deposit insurance regulations, requiring 100% coverage for deposit 
accounts both in Turkish lira and foreign exchange. According to previous 
regulations, the maximum coverage for deposit insurance was 150 million Turkish 
lira, corresponding to USD 4,150 in May 4, 1994. The aim was to support the 
banking sector and improve its financial condition by preventing ‘deposit 
withdrawal panic’. Full coverage application remained unchanged after 1994, but 
some financial conditions of the banks worsened. One bank in 1997, one bank in 
1998, and six banks in 1999 were transferred to the SDIF. In other words, what was 
suggested as a remedy created additional problems in the long run, such as putting 
upward pressure on interest rates, raising the amount of non-performing loans, 
increasing banks’ default risks, and discouraging depositors from monitoring their 
banks.  
The main purpose of this study is to measure the effects of extended deposit 
insurance coverage on the financial strength of banks in Turkey.  
2. The Banking Sector In Turkey, 1991-1998 
The banking sector is one of the most rapidly growing sectors despite the 
economic and political instability in Turkey. By the end of 1998, the Turkish 
banking sector consisted of 42 commercial banks (4 of which are state-owned), 15 
investment and development banks (3 of which are state-owned), and 18 foreign 
banks.  
Although the Turkish economy has suffered from chronic high inflation, huge 
budget deficits and crises in other countries, the Turkish banking sector has been a 
strong impetus in Turkey’s development. As stated by Denizer (1997, p.1), “Until 
1980, Turkish financial system has developed under an umbrella of monetary and 
regulatory policies aimed at supporting the state orchestrated development 
strategy.”   
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Since 1980 there has been movement towards financial liberalization. Reforms 
initiated were expected to make the financial system more competitive, more 
efficient and more capable of encouraging an increasingly outward-oriented 
economy. These reforms were mostly achieved through the deregulation process, 
while eliminating interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans, introducing new types 
of financial instruments and institutions, and easing market entry. Reforms were 
successful in attracting entry into the banking system, resulting in an increase in the 
number of banks from 43 to 66 between 1980-1990 (Denizer, 1997). 
Economic and political developments in both the national and international 
arenas have affected the Turkish banking sector. However, economic policy efforts 
helped the financial system stay away from the systemic risk. In terms of the ratio 
of its total assets to GNP, the Turkish banking sector has continued to grow since 
1991. The ratio reached 70 % in 1998, up from 46 % in 1991 (Table 1). 
Table 1 
The Ratio of Bank Assets to GNP 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 
Ratio  46.4 49.9 52.5 51.3 51.8 59.8 65.3  70.0 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
Table 2 provides the asset share of each group in the sector. The banking 
sector’s total assets increased by 103 % from 1991 to 1998. In 1998, privately 
owned commercial banks held the largest portion of total assets with 59 %. The 
second largest share (37 %) was held by the four state-owned commercial banks, 
representing the leading role of public banks in the sector. 
Table 2  
The Asset Share of Commercial Banks in Total Assets 
 ASSETS 
    SBA/TBA FBA/TBA PBA/TBA 
1991 46  3  50 
1992 46  4  50 
1993 40  4  56 
1994 43  3  54 
1995 41  3  56 
1996 41  3  56 
1997 37  5  59 
1998 37  5  59 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
SBA: STATE-OWNED COM.BANKS ASSETS  
TBA: TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS ASSETS  
FBA: FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS ASSETS  
PBA: PRIVATELY OWNED COM. BANKS ASSETS  
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One of the most important characteristics of the Turkish banking sector is its 
strong relationship with the government. The ratio of total T-bills and government 
bonds to liquid assets is the most helpful criterion to understand this relationship. 
Since the public sector borrowing requirement is compensated by domestic 
borrowing, the share of T-bills and government bonds in liquid assets increased to 
33 % in 1998 (Table 3). 
Table 3 
The Comparison of T-Bills, Government Bonds and Liquid Assets (Million USD) 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Liquid  Assets  20,568 24,732 29,893 20,396  25,246 30,347 31,683  38,074 
   T-bill  2,170 1,138  667  1,764  2,052  3,681  3,419  5,365 
   Govt. Bond  3,661 4,684  5,886  2,359  2,804  4,159  6,030  7,212 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
The other important characteristic of the Turkish banking sector is its weakening 
relationship with the real sector. Loans represent this relationship fairly well. The 
ratio of total loans to total assets has decreased since 1991, except for 1995 and 
1997. While privately owned commercial banks sustained their loan levels at 
around 40 %, the ratio for the state-owned banks decreased to 31.3% in 1998. State-
owned banks’ resources were mostly used to finance the budget deficit and for 
agricultural subsidies in particular (Table 4). The Governor of the Central Bank of 
Turkey, Gazi Ercel, (April 1997) emphasized that the main obstacle to the 
functioning of the financial markets is the public sector borrowing requirement, 
which crowds out other demands for financing. Ercel states that, “The inability of 
domestic resources to cover the financing needs of the public sector has kept real 
interest rates very high for over a decade (Ercel, 1997, p.2). 
Table 4 
The Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets 
    1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
SECTOR  43.9 41.8 41.4 39.1 42.5 43.1 45.5 38.2 
COMMERCIAL  BANKS  42.3 40.2 39.9 37.4 40.8 41.3 44.1 36.5 
      State-Owned  44.8 41.1 39.9 37.6 44.2 39.5 45.6 31.3 
      Privately-owned  39.8 39.8 40.5 38.0 39.1 43.6 44.7 40.6 
      Foreign  44.0 34.5 30.9 23.8 27.9 25.3 26.3 25.6 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998.  
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On the asset side, banks’ credit performance worsened significantly in 1998. 
During the last decade, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans increased 
from 4.9 % to 7.2 %. The higher level of credit allocation in 1997 was followed by 
a higher level of non-performing loans in 1998. Table 5 indicates that foreign banks 
are the most successful banks in terms of selecting credit customers, since they have 
had the lowest ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
Table 5 
The Ratio of Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans 
    1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
SECTOR  4.9 3.4 3.1 4.1 2.8 2.0 2.1 7.2 
COMMERCIAL  BANKS  4.9 3.2 2.9 3.4 2.3 1.9 2.2 7.7 
      State-Owned  7.2 4.1 4.5 4.0 3.0 2.4 2.5 5.5 
      Privately-owned  2.7 2.3 1.8 2.6 1.8 1.6 2.0 9.0 
   Foreign  2.4  2.9  2.9  11.1  3.1  2.4  1.3  1.3 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
On the liability side, the ratio of deposit accounts to total liabilities for 
commercial banks reached a high level of 66 % in 1998. Although the ratio of 
deposits to liabilities for commercial banks was around 55%, on average between 
the period 1991 and 1998, it decreased to 48 % during the financial crisis of 1994 
(Figure 1). The full coverage on deposits, whether denominated in Turkish lira or 
foreign currencies, was introduced immediately after the crisis and then remained 
unchanged. 
Fig. 1. The Ratio of Deposits to Liabilities for Commercial Banks. 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
The bank panic and 1994 crisis are further illustrated through an 
examination of diversification of deposits according to currency types. Since the 
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share of foreign exchange deposits in total deposits exceeded more than the share of 
TL deposits both in 1994 and 1995. Table 6 shows this dollarization process in 
Turkey. 
Table 6 
The Diversification of Deposits (%) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
TL  67.86 63.17 60.56 48.20 48.68 53.61 52.81 55.27 
FX  32.14 36.83 39.44 51.80 51.32 46.39 47.19 44.73 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
With regard to deposit accounts, another interesting development is in the 
diversification of time and demand deposits (Table 7). While 29 % of total deposits 
were demand deposits in 1991, this proportion decreased to 19 % by 1998; thus, the 
proportion of time deposits increased to 81 % in 1998 due to higher real interest 
rates. 
Table 7 
Time and Demand Deposits (million USD) 
        DEPOSITS 














1991 10,861  11,808 391 23,060  4,231 5,063  261  9,555  32,615 
1992 12,661  11,958 313 24,932  4,996 5,295  303 10,594  35,526 
1993 11,386  14,715 326 26,427  4,949 5,862  268 11,079  37,506 
1994 10,951  12,678 305 23,934  3,432 5,106  324  8,862  32,796 
1995 15,073  17,496 685 33,254  4,155 6,499  522 11,176  44,430 
1996 17,599  23,475  1,037  42,111  7,586 7,051  417 15,054  57,165 
1997 19,282  27,293  1,618  48,193  5,146 7,459  474 13,079  61,272 
1998 25,327  35,522  1,735  62,584  6,034 8,147  333 14,514  77,098 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
Despite the dollarization process and adverse diversification of deposit accounts, 
Table 8 shows that Turkish banks are highly profitable banks. In his article in 
Euromoney, Shirreff (1997, p.57) notes “Turkey’s banks are among the most 
profitable in the world. Why? Because the government rewards them royally for 
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Table 8 
Banking Sector Profits in Selected OECD Countries (Pre-Tax Profits Scaled By Average Assets) 
 1994-1996  * 








Source: Turkey: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Staff Country Report, 2000, No.14, p.38. 
* Average for 1994-1996 
** Average for 1997 and 1998, after monetary correction 
Data in Table 9 indicate that the most profitable group of commercial banks is 
foreign commercial banks. The group has the largest ratio. Furthermore, privately 
owned commercial banks were almost three times more profitable than the state-
owned commercial banks in 1998. Indeed, it can be surmised that it is mainly high 
real interest rates that keep the Turkish banks’ profitability at a high level.  
Table 9 
Return On Average Assets (%) 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998
SECTOR 2.4 2.8 3.5 2.2 3.4 3.9 3.4  2.8
COMMERCIAL BANKS  2.5 2.9 3.6 2.5 3.5 3.8 3.4  2.6
   State-Owned  0.7 2.1 3.1 -0.1 0.2 0.9 0.8  1.1
   Privately-owned  3.9 3.1 3.9 3.8 5.7 5.8 4.8  3.2
    Foreign  7.1 8.0 5.2 12.1 7.5 6.9 6.8  7.1
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
The ratio of securities to total assets is very useful for the evaluation of the 
profitability of banks. As seen in Table 10 and 11, foreign commercial banks 
invested in T-bills and government bonds more than the other banks and became 
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Table 10 
Security Structure of Commercial Banks 
SECURITIES SECURITIES/TOTAL  ASSETS 
    SBS/TBS FBS/TBS PBS/TBS SBS/TBA FBS/TBA PBS/TBA 
1991  45 5 51  12  17  13 
1992  50 5 45  13  15  11 
1993  55 4 41  16  12 9 
1994  48 4 47  13  15  10 
1995  38 4 58  10  13  12 
1996  43 5 52  17  24  15 
1997  29 6 65  11  17  15 
1998  27 7 66  11  23  16 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
SBS: STATE-OWNED COMMMERCIAL BANKS SECURITIES  
TBS: TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS' SECURITIES  
PBS: PRIVATELY OWNED COMMMERCIAL BANKS SECURITIES  
FBS: FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS SECURITIES  
TBA: TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS ASSETS  
Table 11 
Profitability Ratios (%) 
      1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Net 
Income(Loss)/Average 
Total Assets  Total Commercial Banks  2 2.3 2.9 1.6 3 3.1 2.6 2.1 
      State-Owned Banks  0.5 1.7 2.4 0 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.7 
      Foreign Banks  5.7 6.6 4.2 7.3 6.4 5.5 5.7 6 
      Privatey-Owned Banks  3.1 2.5 3.2 2.4 4.9 4.6 3.8 2.7 
                 
Net 
Income(Loss)/Average 
Shareholders' Equity  Total Commercial Banks  27.6 36.8 47.4 24.3 47 50.9 43.8 36.4 
      State-Owned Banks  9.2 38.5 48.9 -0.8 3.3 17.6 14.2 16.2 
      Foreign Banks  68.4 81.5 59.6 103.6 80 63.6 78.1 90.2 
      Privatey-Owned Banks  37.4 32.5 45.6 34.5 66 63.8 54.1 39.9 
                 
Net 
Income(Loss)/Average 
Share Capital  Total Commercial Banks  46.3 54.8 76.2 43.8 89 98.4 69.8 49 
      State-Owned Banks  14.3 44.7 70.3 -1.5 6.9 40.9 27.5 27.9 
      Foreign Banks  86.2 104.4 77.1 136.2 125.5 91.8 98.1 116.6 
      Privatey-Owned Banks  67.8 57.7 80.2 60.3 120.7 117.9 81.7 49.7 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
On the other hand, in terms of capital adequacy, private-owned commercial 
banks have a significant advantage over state-owned commercial banks. Also, 
income-expenditure structure of banks is in compliance with profitability ratios. 
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An evaluation of the main characteristics of the Turkish banking sector indicates 
that Turkish banks are highly exposed to banking risks such as credit risk, interest 
rate risk, and foreign exchange risk. Dollarization process and uncertainty in the 
financial markets due to persistent high inflation are among the basic problems that 
make the banks more vulnerable to these risks. During the last two decades, the 
Turkish banking sector has made remarkable progress towards liberalization. But 
still, structural reforms are needed to reduce the share of state owned commercial 
banks in the sector. 
3. Empirical Study 
This study analyzes the impact of full coverage deposit insurance application on 
bank failure in Turkey. To be able to measure this impact, first the factors that are 
associated with the degree of bank soundness should be analyzed. The proposed 
approach is to estimate the probability of a bank failure using probit estimation over 
a sample of 35 privately owned commercial banks for the period 1991-1998. The 
model tests empirically the proposition that bank failure in Turkey is determined by 
bank specific factors, macroeconomic conditions, and full coverage deposit 
insurance application. For more details on the probit model approaches, see Greene 
(1997), Ramanathan (1998). 
3.1. Research Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis in this thesis is the proposition that there is a positive and 
significant correlation between full coverage application of deposit insurance and a 
bank’s failure in Turkey. The hypotheses are summarized below. 
1. Full coverage deposit insurance application is an important contributory factor 
in bank failure in Turkey. It increases banking system vulnerability and creates a 
moral hazard problem so that a bank has the incentive to take on higher risk. 
2. Stabilization programs aimed at reducing the inflation rate may increase the 
probability of bank failure. 
3. Lack of risk free and high return liquid assets increases the likelihood of bank 
failure.  
4. There is a strong and positive relation between the level of non-performing 
loans and bank failure.  
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5. Freezing loans may not prevent bank failure. 
6. Increase in the ratio of foreign currency short position to shareholder’s equity 
increases the probability of bank failure. 
7. Bank failure is driven by lack of shareholders’ equity. 
8. Depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US Dollar may increase the 
probability of bank failure. 
9. Change in interest rates increases the likelihood of bank failure via higher 
interest rate risk. 
10. Capital account developments might affect bank failure. 
11. Developments in the Turkish economy in 1998 due to Russian and Asia 
crises may increase the probability of bank failure. 
12. A bank’s size might be an important factor in bank failure.  
3.2. Data 
Bank specific data used in this study were obtained from the Banks Association 
of Turkey. The sample includes privately owned commercial banks. State owned 
commercial banks are excluded from the sample because they are treated as reliable 
banks in terms of default risk. Investment and development banks are also excluded 
from the sample to maintain homogeneity of the sample. There are eight years of 
data on 35 individual banks constituting 280 observations in the panel data set. 
Annual macroeconomic data were collected from the State Planning Organization 
and the Central Bank of Turkey, covering the period of 1991-1998 in annual 
frequency.  
3.3. The Model 
As stated by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) the econometric study of 
bank failure is a relatively new field of study. In this study, the first step in our 
analysis is to develop an econometric model with which to estimate the probability 
of owned bank failure for banks between 1991 and 1998. The model focuses on the  
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factors that likely play significant roles in bank failure and the role of full coverage 
deposit insurance application in this result.  
The dependent variable, Y, is a measure of bank failure in discrete form, taking 
the value of 1 for failure of a bank and 0 otherwise. When a bank fails, this variable 
takes the value of 1, starting from the previous year that the bank is owned by the 
Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). This is appropriate for our estimation, since 
the SDIF’s decision is based on the last financial statements that were announced to 
the public by the bank. Additionally, SDIF owns the failed bank until its financial 
condition improves. Thus, our independent variable takes the value of 1 as long as a 
bank is owned by SDIF. 
The probability of a bank failure is hypothesized to be a function of a vector of n 
explanatory variables. The pooled regression model assumes that the regression 
parameters do not differ across banks. 
Y=F(X1,X2, X3,…,Xn) 
) χ β ... χ β χ β (β   F   1) (I   Prob n n 2 2 1 1 0 + + + + Φ = = and, 
) χ β ... χ β χ β (β   F   1 ) 0 (I   Prob n n 2 2 1 1 0 + + + + Φ − = =  
where F is the standard normal cumulative density function, and Φ  is the notation 
for the standard normal distribution function. 
The explanatory variables capturing macroeconomic conditions and bank-
specific indicators are defined below.  
DUM   = 0 for the years before 1994,  
= 1 for the years after 1994 (including 1994); 
INF  = The rate of inflation measured as the wholesale price index; 
R1  = Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-deposit Funds), where 
Liquid Assets = Cash + Securities (Treasury Bills, Government Bonds) + 
Reserve Requirements, and 
Non-deposit Funds = Inter-bank Funds + Funds borrowed from Central Bank of 
Turkey or abroad; 
R2  = Non-performing loans in million USD;  
R3  = Total Loans / Total Assets;  
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R4  = Short Position in Foreign Currency / Shareholders' Equity; 
R5  = Shareholder’s Equity in million USD; where  
Shareholder’s Equity = Share Capital + Reserves - Provision for Losses (for 
current and previous years) + Revaluation Funds; 
FX  = The rate of depreciation of Turkish Lira against the US Dollar; and  
CTLINTRATE = Change in the interest rate for annual deposit accounts. Our 
choice of explanatory variables comes from economics and finance theories. 
Specific reasons for this selection are summarized below. 
CCACNT  = Change in capital account 
DUM98     = 0 for the years before 1998,  
    = 1 for the year 1998; 
LNASSET = Log of assets. 
With regard to deposit insurance application in Turkey, a new Decree came into 
effect in 1994, and all bank deposits, whether in the form of Turkish Lira or foreign 
currencies, were fully insured by the SDIF. Since the full coverage deposit 
insurance scheme creates a moral hazard problem in the form of the willingness of 
banks to take on greater risk, insurance is represented by a dummy variable, taking 
the value of zero for observations with partial coverage, and the value of one for 
observations with full coverage. 
Inflation is introduced as an explanatory variable since it is likely to be 
associated with macroeconomic management quality. While reduction in the 
inflation rate provides stability in financial markets, the Turkish experience 
suggests that the stabilization process may put the profitability of banks at risk. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, p.87) note that, “Chronic high inflation 
tends to be associated with overblown financial sector, as financial intermediaries 
profit from the float on payments. When inflation is drastically reduced, banks see 
one of their main sources of revenue disappear, and generalized banking sector 
problems may follow.” Recent banking sector difficulties in Brazil and Russia have 
been explained by a sharp reduction in inflation rate. Thus, in our model the 
expected sign for the coefficient on the inflation rate is ambiguous.  
Huge government deficits are mostly financed by government bonds and 
Treasury Bills. Since the government has been in financial difficulties during the  
 
 
Hülya Bayır / Central Bank Review 1 (2001) 1-23  14
last decade, the rate of return for these instruments is higher than the deposit interest 
rate. A well-developed second market makes these instruments as liquid as cash. 
Furthermore, as observed in Figure 2, the total of deposit and non-deposit funds 
remained almost the same for failed banks for the last 3 years. It is the change in 
total liquid assets that decreased the ratio R1. Thus, it is expected that lack of risk 
free and high-return liquid assets (illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4) reduces 
banks profitability and constitutes an important factor in their failure. Variable R1 
captures this expectation and tests the relevant hypothesis. 
Fig. 2. Deposits and Non-Deposits Funds for Failed and Non-Failed Banks 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
Fig. 3. Liquid Assets of Failed and Non-Failed Banks 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
Fig. 4. The Ratio of Total Liquid Assets to Deposits and Non-Deposit Funds for Failed and Non-
Failed banks 
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Asset quality of banks is mainly based on the quality of their credit evaluation. 
Credit risk primarily corresponds to non-performing loans. Information contained in 
Figure 5 indicates that bank crises in Turkey are associated with a rise in non-
performing loans. Thus, a high level of non-performing loans is expected to be 
positively correlated with the probability of bank failure. The role of non-
performing loans in bank failure is captured by explanatory variable, R2. 
Fig. 5. Non-Performing Loans for Failed and Non-Failed Banks 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
Total loans and total assets of failed banks have remained approximately 
constant during the last three years (Figures 6, 7). The ratio of loan to total assets 
has been decreasing since 1997 (Figure 8). R3 is included in our regression to test 
whether the policy of freezing loans played an important role in bank failure or not. 
Fig. 6. Loans for Failed and Non-Failed Banks 
Source: The Banks Association of Turkey, Banks in Turkey 1998. 
Fig. 7 Total Assets For Failed And Non-Failed Banks  
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Fıg. 8. The Ratio of Loans to Total Assets for Failed and Non-Failed Banks 
Source: The banks association of turkey, banks in turkey 1998. 
R4 examines whether changes in the ratio of foreign currency short position to 
shareholder’s equity affects the probability of banks’ failure.  
Shareholders' equity is captured by R5 and is used to test whether a high level of 
shareholder equity is negatively correlated with the probability of failure (Figure 9). 
Fig. 9. Equity Structure of Failed and Non-Failed Banks 
Source: The banks association of Turkey, banks in Turkey 1998. 
The rate of depreciation of the Turkish lira is added to the regression to test the 
hypothesis that bank failure may be driven by foreign exchange risk.  
Since frequent interest rate changes occur in Turkey, “change in interest rate for 
annual deposit accounts” is used as an explanatory variable in order to test the 
hypothesis that changes in interest rates increase the likelihood of bank failure via 
higher interest risk. 
Frequent change in capital account is included in the model to test whether it 
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On the other hand, the Russian and Asian crises might contribute to bank failure 
in Turkey. A dummy variable for 1998 captures the effects of these crises in the 
Turkish banking sector. 
Finally, the banking sector increased in size over time, as the number of failures 
increased. The size of the bank, in terms of assets, is used to assess whether 
relatively large banks are more likely to survive because, “too large to fail” may 
extend the survival time of larger banks.  
4. Empirical Results 
This chapter presents data detailing the findings from the estimation of eight 
models. Table 12 summarizes these empirical results. 
For the evaluation of statistical significance, the level of significance for each 
coefficient is reported at the bottom of Table 12. Two-tailed t tests are used to 
evaluate the significance of the coefficients of INF, FX, R3, CCACNT, DUM98, 
and LNASSET; one-tail t tests are applied to evaluate the other coefficients. 
Individually, all coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10 % 
level except for CCACNT, DUM98, and LNASSET, implying that the independent 
variables explain some of the variation in the dependent variable. Additionally, the 
signs of any of the other coefficients are not affected by the exclusion of some 
variables from the models. The excluded variables are R4, FX, R5, CCAPTACT, 
DUM98, and LNASSET. In other words, the signs on the coefficients remain the 
same in all specifications, implying the robustness of the effects of independent 
variables on the dependent variable.  
The adequacy of the specification of the models is assessed by three criteria: 
Akaike’s information criteria (AIC), classification (prediction) accuracy, and the F 
statistic. 
The AIC compares models with different degrees of freedom and penalizes the 
model specification when irrelevant explanatory variables are added into the 
regression. As is known, a model with a lower value of AIC is judged to be 
preferable. In this study, regression results indicate that AIC is very small in all 
models, ranging from 0.1368 to 0.17.   
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In order to evaluate the prediction accuracy of our models, the overall 
expectation-prediction (classification) results are analyzed in Table 12, with a 
prediction cutoff value of 50%. Correct classifications are obtained when the 
estimated probability is less than or equal to 0.5 and the observed Y is equal to zero, 
or when the estimated probability is greater than 0.5 and the observed Y is equal to 
one. Overall, the estimated models correctly predict between 97.08 and 98.18 % of 
the 280 observations. The prediction power of the models is high. 
F tests were performed to test the joint significance of the explanatory variables 
by comparing each model to a model with only the intercept. As shown in Table 12, 
the hypothesis that the coefficients on the independent variables are not jointly 
significantly different from zero is rejected at the %6 significance level or less for 
equations (1), (2) and (5).  
Following is a discussion of the interpretation of each estimator used in the 
probit models (Table 13). First, it is noteworthy that all explanatory variables have 
the expected effects in all models. 
Table 13 
Expected and Estimated Signs for Statistically Significant Coefficients and Their Average 
Marginal Effects 
Variable   Expected Sign  Estimated Sign  Average Marginal 
Effect* 
DUM +  +  0.092549 
INF -/+  -  -0.004309 
R1 -  -  -0.004153 
R2 +  +  0.000809 
R3 -/+  -  -0.004073 
R4 +  +  0.000134 
R5 -  -  -0.00106 
FX -/+  +  - 
CINT +  + - 
* The calculation of the average marginal effect is based on the fifth model. 
According to the results, the coefficient on the dummy variable is always 
positive and significant at 5% level in 6 of the equations and significant at 10% 
level in 2 of the equations, supporting the hypothesis that full coverage deposit 
insurance application is a significant contributory factor in bank failure in Turkey. 
As shown in Table 13, on average its effect on bank failure is larger than the effects 
of any of the other variables in the models.  
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With respect to bank specific variables, the higher value of non-performing loans 
as well as the ratio of foreign currency short position to shareholder’s equity is 
associated with a higher probability of bank failure. In other words, banks with 
fewer non-performing loans, a shorter position in foreign currency, and with more 
capital are less likely to fail in Turkey.  
In contrast, the higher value of risk free and high return liquid assets, 
shareholder’s equity as well as the ratio of loans to total assets for each bank lowers 
the likelihood of bank failure. Additionally, the coefficient on LNASSET was 
insignificant in Model 8, implying that bank failure in Turkey is not associated with 
the size of banks.  
When considering the macroeconomic variables, stabilization programs aimed at 
reducing inflation rate, depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US Dollar, and 
changes in interest rates are highly and positively correlated with a higher 
probability of bank failure. The coefficient on the inflation rate suggests that 
stability programs create an unfavorable climate for the banking sector. 
Besides, the empirical results suggest that frequent change in the capital account 
and economic developments in 1998 do not play significant roles in the probability 
of bank failure. The coefficients on these variables (CCACNT, DUM98) were 
statistically insignificant in models 6 and 7. In other words, bank failure in Turkey 
cannot be correlated with the Asian and Russian crises. 
To summarize, full coverage deposit insurance had a negative impact on bank 
soundness in Turkey. In order to be able to evaluate the role of deposit insurance 
policy in the banking sector, other possible factors were considered that may effect 
a bank’s financial position. In brief, the results suggest that bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables, and also the application of full coverage of deposit 
insurance policy, are significant determinants of bank failure in Turkey. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This study argues that full coverage deposit insurance application deteriorated 
the financial condition of banks in Turkey. This impact is measured after 
controlling for the other bank-specific and macroeconomic factors affecting the 
degree of bank soundness. The probability of bank failure was analyzed using a 
probit model on 35 privately owned commercial banks for the period, 1991-1998.   
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Overall, the five estimated models correctly predict bank failure or survival 97 % 
- 98 % of the time. This implies that the variables we choose for our models are 
very important determinants of bank failure, and that the model performs well. 
Estimation results uniformly suggest that full coverage deposit insurance 
application makes bank failure more likely in Turkey. Current deposit insurance 
policy is an important contributory factor in bank failure. It increases a bank’s 
fragility and creates a moral hazard problem in the form of higher risk taking. As a 
policy recommendation, we suggest that the Turkish government should change the 
full coverage policy as soon as possible.   
There are several ways to get the best results from deposit insurance. According 
to Garcia (1994), “The best practice of deposit insurance should: 
Avoid incentive problems, 
Define the system explicitly, in law and regulation, 
Give the system supervisor a system of prompt remedial actions, 
Ensure that the supervisor resolves failed depository institutions promptly, 
Provide low coverage, 
Make membership compulsory, 
Pay deposits quickly, 
Ensure adequate sources of funding to avoid insolvency, 
Risk-adjust premiums, 
Organize good information, 
Make appropriate disclosure, 
Create an independent, but accountable Deposit Insurance System (DIS) agency, 
Have bankers on an advisory, not the main board, 
Ensure close relations with the Lender of last resort and the supervisor, 
Begin an explicit, limited DIS when the banking system is sound. 
Consequently, inclusion should be open only to those classes of depository 
institutions that are well regulated and supervised.” (Garcia, 1994, p.10)  
 
 
Hülya Bayır / Central Bank Review 1 (2001) 1-23  22
The empirical results show that stabilization programs aimed at reducing the 
inflation rate create an unfavorable climate for the banking sector. At this point, the 
government should pursue an explicit inflation targeting policy to prevent banks 
from having to respond to unexpected changes in the inflation rate. A supervisory 
agency should also monitor banks more frequently during the application of these 
programs.  
Lack of risk free and high return liquid assets also increases the likelihood of 
bank failure. The relevant coefficient is always negative and significant, implying 
that the regulatory agency should apply a liquidity ratio diversification policy for 
banks with different financial conditions. More specifically, it should require a 
higher liquidity ratio for banks whose financial conditions are worsening.  
On the other hand, a strong and positive relationship between the level of non-
performing loans and bank failure should always be kept in mind. Empirical 
findings also suggest that freezing credit does not prevent banks from failure. The 
policy should be to increase the quality of loans rather than freezing them to 
strengthen a bank’s financial position.   
Furthermore, change in the ratio of foreign currency short position to 
shareholder’s equity definitely increases the probability of bank failure. This 
empirical result is consistent with the other empirical result that depreciation of the 
Turkish Lira against the US Dollar worsens a bank’s financial condition. The more 
short position in foreign currency that banks take, the greater the probability is that 
they will fail.  
Similarly, it is found that an increase in the interest rate increases the likelihood 
of a bank failure. Thus, the supervisory agency should pay close attention to both 
exchange rate risk and interest rate risk in their evaluations. 
The empirical results also point out that bank failure is primarily driven by lack 
of shareholders’ equity. The minimum required level of shareholder equity should 
be differentiated according to the bank’s financial conditions. Financially distressed 
banks should be required to have more equity than other banks.  
On the other hand, the reason why the SDIF owned the 8 banks but not the other 
banks has been argued over the last two years in Turkey. Among the sample of 35 
privately owned commercial banks, whether a bank is going to fail at a particular 
time between 1991 and 1998 is predicted with accuracy for 97 % and 98 % of 280 
observations. Our findings do not contradict the decision of the SDIF. Each of our  
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alternative models suggests that the SDIF is consistent in its decision to evaluate 
banks’ conditions. However, it should be kept in mind that one drawback of this 
study may be the poor quality of data due to misleading records in the banks’ 
financial statements. 
The best practice of deposit insurance policy including proper risk-adjust 
premiums and deposit coverage limit for Turkey is left for future work. 
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